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Mr. Maafield D. Sprague
Chairman, The President's Committee on
Information Activities Abroad
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Maafield:

You have asked us to identify eight or ten issues which seem to us to warrant particular attention and emphasis in the Committee's report. Before addressing myself to this problem I should like to offer one or two general comments.

It is possible, of course, to single out certain activities or programs (such for example as a substantial program of aid to foreign educational development) which appear to offer particularly rewarding opportunities for influencing public opinion abroad. Such programs serve directly to promote the development, over the long run, of a climate of foreign opinion which is responsive to American principles and ideals and the establishment of institutions and political frameworks which are compatible with American policies and objectives. To the extent that the United States is identified with these programs, its image as a responsible benefactor of mankind and a leader in the development of free democracy will also be very considerably enhanced.

Other programs (such as VOA, certain of the other informational activities of USIA and RFE) which are designed to articulate and explain American policies and accomplishments or to expose or refute Communist allegations or misrepresentations also serve a vital purpose. Increased support to and expansion of these truly "informational" activities, at least in some areas, would seem desirable and calculated to improve foreign understanding and respect for the United States and its positions and policies.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Via Reading

Sprague Conn.
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I do not believe, however, that our purposes will be served solely by the initiation of one or more new programs or the revitalization or expansion of old ones, no matter how beneficial or effective particular individual programs may be. Basically our problem and objective is the establishment of stable world order based on free and responsible institutions. Our energies and resources must be devoted to this purpose across the board, particularly in the less developed areas, as well as to the purpose of containing, frustrating and, ultimately eliminating Communist threats and dominion. What is called for is integrated effort involving the improvement and, where appropriate, the expansion of all activities, simultaneously, on all fronts, economic, political, military, and propaganda.

Since the Jackson Committee Report in 1953, the Soviet image has grown in certain areas of the world, particularly those less developed, less educated and hence less sophisticated. This has been due in part to the rapid Soviet advances in military, and particularly nuclear power, and ballistic missiles, in its scientific pioneering, particularly in space, and most of all in appearing to associate itself with the aspirations of the states and areas which are newly emerging from colonialism, such as Indonesia and Black Africa, and with states, such as Egypt, Cuba, and Iraq which are attempting to achieve a new order through the revolutionary process.

Thus substantial segments of world opinion see the Soviets as leaders in the field of science and technology, as a hope for economic and social progress and, despite the lessons of Hungary, even as a defender of political independence and freedom. They have done a good job in recent years of selling Communism as the wave of the future, particularly to the underdeveloped areas where nationalism and neutralism are strong sentiments. They have shown flexibility and adroitness in the use of economic assistance which they have successfully used as a political instrument, as in Guinea for example, to isolate the emerging governments of some underdeveloped areas from Western associations and to identify themselves with the aspirations of these governments.

They have distorted the image of the United States and associated us with militarism and colonialism and what they describe as a "decadent capitalism" interested only in preserving its own wealth. While many see through this false picture painted by Soviet propaganda,

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much of it has stuck in the minds of emerging groups throughout the world. Moreover, they have, at times, endeavored and occasionally succeeded in creating dissension and distrust between us and our allies by imputing to the United States ulterior and materialistic motives and by perverting the role of the United States on such issues as atomic testing and the maintenance of military bases in Allied territory for purposes of collective defense.

Individual programs, no matter how well conceived or executed, will not serve to meet this challenge to our prestige or meet the requirements of our responsibility for effective leadership. If we are to prevail we must carry forward in a concerted effort in which all instrumentalities available to the United States for the purpose of influencing foreign opinion and affecting political attitudes and judgments are mobilized or orchestrated in support of policy objectives which are as clearly defined and expressed as is possible, given the complexity of the world political situation. I might say parenthetically that our efforts should be guided by a determination to maintain the world's respect, not to win its affection.

One further general point that I would like to make concerns the necessity for adequate coordination of our various activities in the interests of achieving integrated programs calculated to produce the maximum possible impact in selected areas. Although improvement, of course, is possible in the machinery for exchange of views and information as between interested Agencies and Departments of the Government and for ensuring effective coordination of programs at the Washington level, it is my impression that existing procedures are reasonably adequate for this purpose. In connection with any review of the mechanics governing coordination of activity and the formulation of policy in the information field, it might be desirable to consider ways for improving and developing more effective relations between the Government generally and private organizations engaged in charitable, academic or commercial activity abroad. It is also my opinion that more can be done to improve coordination in the initiation and execution of programs at the country level.

As regards specific issues or programs which appear to warrant particular emphasis in the Committee's report, my views are as follows:

- a. Priority of Effort. The opportunities and requirements for activity calculated to influence opinion in the

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underdeveloped areas, particularly Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, clearly call for increased support and attention. In all probability effective action in certain of these areas will involve additional allocation of funds and, most important, of trained manpower. I should think it well for the Committee to indicate the priority which should be attached to programs directed at these areas. I should also think it important for the Committee to recommend, however, that resources should not be allocated to the support of these programs at the expense of the effort desirable to maintain the vigor and cohesion of the Western Alliance or to exploit opportunities for influencing opinion to our advantage in the Communist Bloc.

b. Aid to Education. Perhaps the most rewarding activity which the United States can undertake is support on a very substantial basis to foreign educational development. This will involve the resources and energies of several agencies of the Government as well as many private charitable organizations and educational institutions, and should be undertaken on a thoroughly coordinated basis. Consideration should be given to the most effective method, preferably through existing mechanisms and within the existing structure of the Government, of providing adequate leadership, initiative and coordination for such a program or programs and ensuring full participation by all agencies, official or private, capable of contributing effectively to educational development in significant areas abroad.

While I also believe in bringing selected foreign students to this country, this can quickly reach the saturation point and sustaining programs should emphasize the graduate student level.

c. English Language and Technical Aids in Relationship to Educational Programs. Corollary to the importance of programs to support foreign education are:

(1) A vigorous effort to encourage the spread of the use of the English language in foreign countries both by encouraging and supporting programs and educational facilities which teach or aid in the teaching

of English and by promoting the use or adoption of English as a technical lingua franca as is presently the usage in international air control. Here both the Soviet and particularly the Chinese Communists are at a serious disadvantage and quite generally resort to English as the means of spreading their own propaganda.

(2) The development and distribution of mechanical and technical aids to education with particular emphasis on the potentialities of television as a method of education.

Staff papers of the Committee have dealt with these subjects and the recommendations of these papers appeal to me as particularly important.

d. Unattributed Propaganda. I believe that the Committee's report would do well to stress the importance of unattributed or gray propaganda as a persuasive means of conveying ideas and interpreting policies and events to audiences and readers, particularly in neutralist areas. Provided existing procedures designed to ensure coordination of propagation and dissemination of gray propaganda and to protect significant clandestine operations are continued and observed, I believe that the unattributed propaganda effort should be intensified and expanded. Often other countries should be allowed to take the lead in exposing Communist intrigues. For example, it was rightfully India which was in the forefront of the attack against Communist aggression in Tibet.

e. Grass Roots Propaganda.

(1) It would be useful if the report were to recommend greater emphasis on mass activities and appeal. We have tended overly to concentrate on persons associated with governments in power. We need to train activists and support grass roots type activities as a counter to the major Communist efforts in this field through the Communist Party and its many front organizations.

(2) We should expand our encouragement to free labor organizations in their attack on the many Communist-dominated Trade Unions in countries such as Italy, France, Indonesia and Japan.

(3) We should also increase our effort in identifying the younger potential leadership elements, particularly in the newly emerging states, and encourage their progress and secure their loyalty to Western ideals.

f. The United Nations as a Public Opinion Forum.

I have been impressed with the arguments advanced in the Committee's staff paper on the United Nations in favor of a more flexible and positive use of the United Nations as a forum for influencing public opinion abroad. I certainly do not believe that propaganda considerations should govern the formulation of our position on questions at issue in the United Nations, nor should we sponsor or support proposals which are at variance with our legitimate strategic interests. I believe, however, that it would be both possible and desirable for the United States to develop positions with a view to their popular appeal particularly where there is little or no practical possibility that they would be adopted by the Soviet Bloc to our disadvantage. Similar considerations appear to me to apply to negotiations in the field of disarmament, a subject which has also been covered in a Committee staff paper.

g. Science, Technology, and Medicine. It seems to me of particular importance that foreign populations should be given an accurate understanding of United States accomplishments and capabilities in science, technology, and medicine. I agree with the conclusions of the Committee's staff paper on this subject with respect to the need for broader and more effective dissemination of information concerning United States achievements in these fields. I also believe, as the Committee's paper suggests, that programs relating to research and development can be formulated with greater consideration to their potential impact on foreign opinion. Both of these points appear to deserve emphasis in the Committee's report.

h. Cultural Activities. I believe that consideration should be given to recommending an expansion of activities designed to promote a broader understanding and appreciation of Western art and culture, particularly in the less developed areas of the world and also in the Communist Bloc itself. Much has already

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been accomplished along these lines through organizations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, through private Foundations and through officially supported exhibitions of art by Western Artists and tours by Western scholars and musicians in appropriate areas. These activities deserve increased support and attention.

In this connection more can be done to refute the impression, which we ourselves have helped to create (see special August, 1960 number of the Atlantic Monthly), that Soviet Russia is a land of art and culture. The facts are that the Soviet Union and China, since the Communist take-over, have starved most of the creative arts, suppressed literature and produced no painting or sculpture worthy of serious consideration. The poverty of the Communist contribution to art and culture could well be brought home by the dissemination of comparative studies and through exhibits, appropriately designed for this purpose and generally be made the subject of more effective propaganda exploitation.

Obviously there are many other activities and issues which deserve consideration and probably considerable attention in the Committee's report. The ones that I have mentioned, however, strike me as of particular current interest and clearly within the Committee's terms of reference.

I have purposely not mentioned certain programs, such as those involving support to international organizations in various fields or involving methods of influencing popular opinion in the Communist Bloc through personal contacts, exchange programs or the dissemination of literature. While of very great importance, the significance of these and similar activities is generally understood and they are being conducted effectively under existing programs. A general recommendation to the effect that activity of this nature should be continued and, where appropriate, expanded might very usefully be included in the report. The report might also contain some general comment confirming the usefulness and recommending the continuation of radio broadcasting by VOA and the unofficial radios to the peoples of the Soviet Bloc and recommending increased broadcasting to the populations of under-developed areas. Also, continuing study should be made of methods of getting information to the people of Communist China who today are more cut off from Western influence than any other great area of population.

I have also excluded from this letter mention of issues which, although of unquestioned importance, appear to me to involve primarily questions of basic Government or legislative policy. One of the problems, which I mentioned at one of the Committee's meetings, was that of the great impact which could be achieved by the further sharing of our atomic know-how with our NATO friends so that they would not have to expend great sums to achieve even a share of the knowledge which both we and the Soviet have acquired at vast expense.

To conclude;

If we are ever to have a reasonably peaceful and stable world and avoid the tragedy of war, it will have to be achieved by evolution. The Communists agree that this evolution must take place and with their help, they predict that we will complete the cycle whereby Western feudalism which turned to Capitalism will soon become Communism. This was Khrushchev's parting shot to us as he completed his tour of the U. S.

It is our task to see to it that an evolution takes place but in the Communist world whereby they will abandon their ideas of creating a world in the Communist image and create governments in the Communist Bloc devoted to free institutions.

To this end we should carry forward all programs which will open the eyes of the people behind the Iron Curtain to the possibilities of a fuller life; higher living standards, and the tools to enjoy and exploit, through peaceful development, their own great assets and resources.

With the disappearance of Khrushchev and his generation, the last of the fraternity of old Bolsheviks will have passed on. A new generation will emerge. Possibly it will be influenced by industrial leaders and technicians with less of the element of the doctrinaire "Communist". It is not too much to hope that this new generation may help to give a different orientation to Soviet life. These new leaders will have the difficult problem of meeting the growing demand of the Soviet people for more consumer goods and for more of the tools with which to use their increasing leisure, as working hours are reduced.

Much has changed in the years since Stalin died. Many more changes may occur over the next decade. It may well be that,

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without seeming to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union, we can find ways to help channel and develop these trends. Certainly some of the fire and some of the dynamism has gone out of the original Marxist-Leninist thrust. Great revolutions of this kind have generally gone through such evolutionary cycles. We should seek with all the skill at our disposal, through our programs, our contacts, and our example, to make this evolution possible.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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